Arbeitspapier

Ruling elites´ rotation and asset ownership: Implications for property rights

We provide a theory and empirical evidence indicating that the rotation of ruling elites in conjunction with elites´ asset ownership could improve property rights protection in non-democracies. The mechanism that upholds property rights is based on elites´ concern about the security of their own asset ownership in the event they lose power. Such incentives provide a solution to the credible commitment problem in maintaining secure property rights when institutional restrictions on expropriation are weak or absent.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IOS Working Papers ; No. 343

Classification
Wirtschaft
Property Law
Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
Capitalist Systems: Property Rights
Subject
endogenous property rights
credible commitment
“stationary bandit”

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Polishchuk, Leonid
Syunyaevy, Georgiy
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Institut für Ost- und Südosteuropaforschung (IOS)
(where)
Regensburg
(when)
2014

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2014101419574
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Polishchuk, Leonid
  • Syunyaevy, Georgiy
  • Institut für Ost- und Südosteuropaforschung (IOS)

Time of origin

  • 2014

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