Arbeitspapier
Ruling elites´ rotation and asset ownership: Implications for property rights
We provide a theory and empirical evidence indicating that the rotation of ruling elites in conjunction with elites´ asset ownership could improve property rights protection in non-democracies. The mechanism that upholds property rights is based on elites´ concern about the security of their own asset ownership in the event they lose power. Such incentives provide a solution to the credible commitment problem in maintaining secure property rights when institutional restrictions on expropriation are weak or absent.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: IOS Working Papers ; No. 343
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Property Law
Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
Capitalist Systems: Property Rights
- Subject
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endogenous property rights
credible commitment
“stationary bandit”
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Polishchuk, Leonid
Syunyaevy, Georgiy
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Institut für Ost- und Südosteuropaforschung (IOS)
- (where)
-
Regensburg
- (when)
-
2014
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2014101419574
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Polishchuk, Leonid
- Syunyaevy, Georgiy
- Institut für Ost- und Südosteuropaforschung (IOS)
Time of origin
- 2014