Arbeitspapier

Single versus multiple randomization in matching mechanisms

This paper experimentally studies an essential institutional feature of matching markets: Randomization of allocation priorities. I compare single and multiple randomization in the student assignment problem with ties. The Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm is employed after indifferences in school priorities are resolved by either random procedure. The main result is that a significant fraction of individuals prefers multiple to single randomization, although both are equivalent in expectation. Multiple randomization is perceived to be fairer. One theoretical explanation is the failure to disregard compound lotteries. These results show that random procedures are not inherently neutral with respect to preferences and fairness perceptions.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2016/8

Classification
Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Subject
market design
school choice
mechanism design
experiment
deferred acceptance algorithm
randomization
tie-breaking

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Schmelzer, André
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2016

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Schmelzer, André
  • Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Time of origin

  • 2016

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