Arbeitspapier
Legitimacy of Control
What is the motivational effect of imposing a minimum effort require- ment? Agents may no longer exert voluntary effort but merely meet the requirement. Here, we examine how such hidden costs of control change when control is considered legitimate. We study a principal- agent model where control signals the expectations of the principal and the agent meets these expectations because he is guilt-averse. We conjecture that control is more likely to be considered legitimate (i) if it is not exclusively aimed at a specifc agent or (ii) if it protects the endowment of the principal. Given the conjecture, the model predicts that hidden costs are lower when one of the two conditions is met. We experimentally test these predictions and find them confirmed.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Discussion Paper Series ; No. 450
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Subject
-
moral-hazard
intrinsic motivation
guilt-aversion
Leistungsbeurteilung
Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie
Moral Hazard
Leistungsmotivation
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Schnedler, Wendelin
Vadovic, Radovan
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
- (where)
-
Heidelberg
- (when)
-
2007
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Schnedler, Wendelin
- Vadovic, Radovan
- University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2007
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