Artikel

A non-differentiable approach to revenue equivalence

We give a sufficient condition on the type space for revenue equivalence when the set of social alternatives consists of probability distributions over a finite set. Types are identified with real-valued functions that assign valuations to elements of this finite set, and the type space is equipped with the Euclidean topology. Our sufficient condition is stronger than connectedness but weaker than smooth arcwise connectedness. Our result generalizes all existing revenue equivalence theorems when the set of social alternatives consists of probability distributions over a finite set. When the set of social alternatives is finite, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition. This condition is similar to, but slightly weaker than, connectedness.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 2 ; Year: 2007 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 469-487 ; New York, NY: The Econometric Society

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Mathematical Methods
Noncooperative Games
Auctions
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Thema
Revenue equivalence
mechanism design
incentive compatibility
non-differentiable approach
connected type space

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Olszewski, Wojciech
Chung, Kim-Sau
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
The Econometric Society
(wo)
New York, NY
(wann)
2007

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Olszewski, Wojciech
  • Chung, Kim-Sau
  • The Econometric Society

Entstanden

  • 2007

Ähnliche Objekte (12)