Disability in the welfare state: An unemployment problem in disguise?

Arbeitspapier

Economies with low unemployment often have high disability rates. In Norway, the permanent disability insurance rolls outnumber registered unemployment by four to one. Based on administrative register data matched with firms' financial statements and closure data collected from bankruptcy proceedings, we show that a large fraction of Norwegian disability insurance claims can be directly attributed to job displacement and other adverse shocks to employment opportunities. For men, we estimate that job loss more than doubles the risk of entry to permanent disability and that displacements account for fully 28 percent of all new disability insurance claims. We conclude that unemployment and disability insurance are close substitutes.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 4897

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Social Security and Public Pensions ; Health Behavior ; Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty: Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs ; Labor Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs ; Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
• Subject: Disability ; displacement ; social insurance ; employment opportunities ; Behinderte Arbeitskräfte ; Rehabilitation ; Sozialversicherung ; Personalabbau ; Versteckte Arbeitslosigkeit ; Arbeitslosenversicherung ; Substitutionseffekt ; Norwegen

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Bratsberg, Bernt ; Fevang, Elisabeth ; Røed, Knut
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2010

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/36816
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET