Arbeitspapier
Policy Surveillance in the G-20 Fossil Fuel Subsidies Agreement: Lessons for Climate Policy
Inadequate policy surveillance has undermined the effectiveness of multilateral climate agreements. To illustrate an alternative approach to transparency, I evaluate policy surveillance under the 2009 G-20 fossil fuel subsidies agreement. The Leaders of the Group of 20 nations tasked their energy and finance ministers to identify and phase-out fossil fuel subsidies. The G-20 leaders agreed to submit their subsidy reform strategies to peer review and to independent expert review conducted by international organizations. This process of developed and developing countries pledging to pursue the same policy objective, designing and publicizing implementation plans, and subjecting plans and performance to review by international organizations differs considerably from the historic approach under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. This paper draws lessons from the fossil fuel subsidies agreement for climate policy surveillance.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 83.2015
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Energy: General
- Subject
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Transparency
Pledge and Review
International Environmental Agreements
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Aldy, Joseph E.
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (where)
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Milano
- (when)
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2015
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Aldy, Joseph E.
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Time of origin
- 2015