Arbeitspapier

Policy Surveillance in the G-20 Fossil Fuel Subsidies Agreement: Lessons for Climate Policy

Inadequate policy surveillance has undermined the effectiveness of multilateral climate agreements. To illustrate an alternative approach to transparency, I evaluate policy surveillance under the 2009 G-20 fossil fuel subsidies agreement. The Leaders of the Group of 20 nations tasked their energy and finance ministers to identify and phase-out fossil fuel subsidies. The G-20 leaders agreed to submit their subsidy reform strategies to peer review and to independent expert review conducted by international organizations. This process of developed and developing countries pledging to pursue the same policy objective, designing and publicizing implementation plans, and subjecting plans and performance to review by international organizations differs considerably from the historic approach under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. This paper draws lessons from the fossil fuel subsidies agreement for climate policy surveillance.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 83.2015

Classification
Wirtschaft
International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Energy: General
Subject
Transparency
Pledge and Review
International Environmental Agreements

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Aldy, Joseph E.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(where)
Milano
(when)
2015

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Aldy, Joseph E.
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Time of origin

  • 2015

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