Arbeitspapier

Publicly Provided Unemployment Insurance and Commitment

A model is constructed in which, given the inability of implicit contracts to be self-enforcing, a minimum wage policy combined with unemployment insurance can be welfare-improving. Unemployment insurance can be decentralized to the private sector if the government can commit to a minimum wage. However, if it cannot , a government which acts in the interest of the workers will have an incentive to increase the minimum wage to exploit private insurers. The full commitment optimum can be achieved by publicly provided unemployment insurance.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Queen's Economics Department Working Paper ; No. 831

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Boadway, Robin
Marceau, Nicolas
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Queen's University, Department of Economics
(wo)
Kingston (Ontario)
(wann)
1991

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Boadway, Robin
  • Marceau, Nicolas
  • Queen's University, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 1991

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