Arbeitspapier
Publicly Provided Unemployment Insurance and Commitment
A model is constructed in which, given the inability of implicit contracts to be self-enforcing, a minimum wage policy combined with unemployment insurance can be welfare-improving. Unemployment insurance can be decentralized to the private sector if the government can commit to a minimum wage. However, if it cannot , a government which acts in the interest of the workers will have an incentive to increase the minimum wage to exploit private insurers. The full commitment optimum can be achieved by publicly provided unemployment insurance.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Queen's Economics Department Working Paper ; No. 831
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Boadway, Robin
Marceau, Nicolas
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Queen's University, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Kingston (Ontario)
- (wann)
-
1991
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Boadway, Robin
- Marceau, Nicolas
- Queen's University, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 1991