Agency in family policy : a survey

Arbeitspapier

Given that young children are under the control of their parents, if the government has an interest in either the welfare or the productivity of the former, it has no option but to act through the latter. Parents are, in the ordinary sense of the word, the government’s agents. They are agents also in the sense of Principal-Agent theory if the parental action of concern to the government is private information. This throws doubt on some established optimal-taxation results, and gives rise to some new ones.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2664

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Household Production and Intrahousehold Allocation ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies; includes inheritance and gift taxes ; Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: Household ; Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth ; Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
• Subject: optimal taxation ; optimal family allowances ; hidden ability to raise children ; hidden educational investments ; endogenous and exogenous fertility ; Familienpolitik ; Familienbesteuerung ; Optimale Besteuerung ; Eltern ; Kinderbetreuung ; Bildungsinvestition ; Asymmetrische Information ; Agency Theory ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Cigno, Alessandro
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2009

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30650
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET