Arbeitspapier
Noisy commitments: the impact of information accuracy on efficiency
We report an experiment designed to test the influence of noisy commitments on efficiency in a simple bargaining game. We investigate two different levels of commitment reliability in a variant of the peasant-dictator game. Theoretical analysis suggests that the reliability of commitments in this game does not affect efficiency. We find that accurate commitments promote efficiency, as expected by game theory. However, noisy commitments are found to impair efficiency. We explain this effect by the differences between incentives off the equilibrium path under conditions of accurate commitments and noisy commitments. This difference changes the game structure and in the current game facilitates more random responses.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2006,4
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
- Subject
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Commitments
efficiency
experimental economics
information
trust
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Ert, Eyal
Nicklisch, Andreas
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
- (where)
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Bonn
- (when)
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2006
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Ert, Eyal
- Nicklisch, Andreas
- Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Time of origin
- 2006