Bottleneck links, essential intermediaries, and competing paths of diffusion in networks

Artikel

We investigate how information goods are priced and diffused over links in a network. A new equivalence relation between nodes captures the effects of network architecture and locations of sellers on the division of profits, and characterizes the topology of competing (and potentially overlapping) diffusion paths. Sellers indirectly appropriate profits over intermediation chains from buyers in their equivalence classes. Links within the same class constitute bottlenecks for information diffusion and confer monopoly power. Links that bridge distinct classes are redundant for diffusion and generate competition among sellers. In dense networks, competition limits the scope of indirect appropriability and intellectual property rights foster innovation.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 16 ; Year: 2021 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 1017-1053 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; Network Formation and Analysis: Theory ; Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks ; Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes
• Subject: Networks ; diffusion ; indirect appropriability ; captive markets ; intermediation ; competition ; bottlenecks ; redundant links ; information goods ; copying ; intellectual property

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Manea, Mihai
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): The Econometric Society
• (where): New Haven, CT
• (when): 2021

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.3982/TE4385
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/253536
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET