Artikel

Informed intermediaries

I develop a theory of intermediation in a market where agents meet bilaterally to trade and buyers cannot commit to payments. Some agents observe the past trading history of traders in the market. These informed agents can secure trades by punishing traders who previously defaulted. The punishing strategy affects equilibrium prices and determines which trades are hindered by the risk of default. Intermediation is a robust equilibrium feature, generated by asymmetric punishing strategies that yield informed agents either more effective opportunities to trade or the ability to extract more surplus in trades.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 17 ; Year: 2022 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 57-87 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Classification
Wirtschaft
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
Subject
Intermediation
limited commitment
bilateral trade
trade network

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Onuchic, Paula
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
The Econometric Society
(where)
New Haven, CT
(when)
2022

DOI
doi:10.3982/TE4072
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Onuchic, Paula
  • The Econometric Society

Time of origin

  • 2022

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