Artikel
Informed intermediaries
I develop a theory of intermediation in a market where agents meet bilaterally to trade and buyers cannot commit to payments. Some agents observe the past trading history of traders in the market. These informed agents can secure trades by punishing traders who previously defaulted. The punishing strategy affects equilibrium prices and determines which trades are hindered by the risk of default. Intermediation is a robust equilibrium feature, generated by asymmetric punishing strategies that yield informed agents either more effective opportunities to trade or the ability to extract more surplus in trades.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 17 ; Year: 2022 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 57-87 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
- Subject
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Intermediation
limited commitment
bilateral trade
trade network
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Onuchic, Paula
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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The Econometric Society
- (where)
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New Haven, CT
- (when)
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2022
- DOI
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doi:10.3982/TE4072
- Handle
- Last update
- 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Onuchic, Paula
- The Econometric Society
Time of origin
- 2022