Artikel
Why new ventures grant employee-stock-options
As of 1998, nine percent of the shares of all firms in the US, primarily young and small ones, have been owned, essentially by about 17 million employees. The recent trend of new ventures to grant company-wide stock options plans is an alignment of the interests of management, shareholders, and non-managerial employees. This paper empirically explores the hypothesis that company-wide stock options plans primarily serve the interests of the firm.s management. This is true, whether or not, management owns a stake in the firm.s equity, though the degree of his or her motivation varies depending on the size of his/her stake in the firm.s equity. The paper unambiguously disproves the view that grants of employee stock options are meant to ease cash flow strains for small young firms.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Journal: Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance, JEF ; ISSN: 1551-9570 ; Volume: 7 ; Year: 2002 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 83-103 ; Montrose, CA: The Academy of Entrepreneurial Finance (AEF)
- Classification
-
Management
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Kraizberg, Elli
Gargalas, Vassilios N.
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
The Academy of Entrepreneurial Finance (AEF)
- (where)
-
Montrose, CA
- (when)
-
2002
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Kraizberg, Elli
- Gargalas, Vassilios N.
- The Academy of Entrepreneurial Finance (AEF)
Time of origin
- 2002
Other Objects (12)
Employee stock options
Expensing employee stock options
Why Employee Stock Options Could Be Worth Much More To The Manager
Valuing joint ventures using real options
Valuing Joint Ventures Using Real Options
Stock options and employee behavior
Unveiling international new ventures' success: Employee's entrepreneurial behavior
Share Buybacks and Employee Stock Options
The Cost of Employee Stock Options
The cost of employee stock options
Employee stock ownership and employee performance: Why does ownership affect individual performance?
Why firms form research joint ventures: theory and evidence
Employee stock options
Expensing employee stock options
Why Employee Stock Options Could Be Worth Much More To The Manager
Valuing joint ventures using real options
Valuing Joint Ventures Using Real Options
Stock options and employee behavior
Unveiling international new ventures' success: Employee's entrepreneurial behavior
Share Buybacks and Employee Stock Options
The Cost of Employee Stock Options
The cost of employee stock options
Employee stock ownership and employee performance: Why does ownership affect individual performance?
Why firms form research joint ventures: theory and evidence
Employee stock options
Expensing employee stock options
Why Employee Stock Options Could Be Worth Much More To The Manager
Valuing joint ventures using real options
Valuing Joint Ventures Using Real Options
Stock options and employee behavior
Unveiling international new ventures' success: Employee's entrepreneurial behavior
Share Buybacks and Employee Stock Options
The Cost of Employee Stock Options
The cost of employee stock options
Employee stock ownership and employee performance: Why does ownership affect individual performance?