Moral Judgments, Cognitivism and the Dispositional Nature of Belief: Why Moral Peer Intransigence is Intelligible
- Location
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- ISSN
-
1574-9274
- Extent
-
Online-Ressource
- Language
-
Englisch
- Notes
-
online resource.
- Bibliographic citation
-
Moral Judgments, Cognitivism and the Dispositional Nature of Belief: Why Moral Peer Intransigence is Intelligible ; day:23 ; month:3 ; year:2021 ; pages:1-14
Philosophia ; (23.3.2021), 1-14
- Classification
-
Philosophie
- Creator
-
Eriksson, John
Tiozzo, Marco
- Contributor
-
SpringerLink (Online service)
- DOI
-
10.1007/s11406-021-00326-6
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2021050808092141114545
- Rights
-
Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
-
2025-08-14T10:56:22+0200
Data provider
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Associated
- Eriksson, John
- Tiozzo, Marco
- SpringerLink (Online service)