Moral Judgments, Cognitivism and the Dispositional Nature of Belief: Why Moral Peer Intransigence is Intelligible

Location
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
ISSN
1574-9274
Extent
Online-Ressource
Language
Englisch
Notes
online resource.

Bibliographic citation
Moral Judgments, Cognitivism and the Dispositional Nature of Belief: Why Moral Peer Intransigence is Intelligible ; day:23 ; month:3 ; year:2021 ; pages:1-14
Philosophia ; (23.3.2021), 1-14

Classification
Philosophie

Creator
Eriksson, John
Tiozzo, Marco
Contributor
SpringerLink (Online service)

DOI
10.1007/s11406-021-00326-6
URN
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2021050808092141114545
Rights
Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
Last update
2025-08-14T10:56:22+0200

Data provider

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Associated

  • Eriksson, John
  • Tiozzo, Marco
  • SpringerLink (Online service)

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