Arbeitspapier

When and How to Subsidize Tax-Favored Retirement Accounts?

When and how to subsidize tax-favored pension accounts? To defend myopic workers against themselves, the government introduces a mandatory system but to help savers, it adds taxfavored retirement accounts. If the mandatory system is progressive, then a proportional voluntary system can beneficially dampen the redistribution. If the mandatory system is proportional, then a progressive voluntary system may raise the old-age consumption of the lower-paid. But if both the mandatory and the voluntary systems are proportional and the ceiling is high (as is the case in Hungary), then the latter does not diminish the tension of the mandatory system.

ISBN
978-963-9796-50-8
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IEHAS Discussion Papers ; No. MT-DP - 2009/2

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Social Security and Public Pensions
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making‡
Thema
mandatory pensions
tax-favored retirement accounts
voluntary contributions
subsidies
Altersvorsorge
Private Altersvorsorge
Steuervergünstigung
Subvention
Theorie
Ungarn

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Simonovits, András
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics
(wo)
Budapest
(wann)
2009

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Simonovits, András
  • Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2009

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