Arbeitspapier
When and How to Subsidize Tax-Favored Retirement Accounts?
When and how to subsidize tax-favored pension accounts? To defend myopic workers against themselves, the government introduces a mandatory system but to help savers, it adds taxfavored retirement accounts. If the mandatory system is progressive, then a proportional voluntary system can beneficially dampen the redistribution. If the mandatory system is proportional, then a progressive voluntary system may raise the old-age consumption of the lower-paid. But if both the mandatory and the voluntary systems are proportional and the ceiling is high (as is the case in Hungary), then the latter does not diminish the tension of the mandatory system.
- ISBN
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978-963-9796-50-8
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: IEHAS Discussion Papers ; No. MT-DP - 2009/2
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Social Security and Public Pensions
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making‡
- Subject
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mandatory pensions
tax-favored retirement accounts
voluntary contributions
subsidies
Altersvorsorge
Private Altersvorsorge
Steuervergünstigung
Subvention
Theorie
Ungarn
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Simonovits, András
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics
- (where)
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Budapest
- (when)
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2009
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Simonovits, András
- Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics
Time of origin
- 2009