Arbeitspapier
Pledges of commitment and cooperation in partnerships
We use experimental methods to investigate whether pledges of commitment can improve cooperation in endogenously formed partnerships facing a social dilemma. Treatments vary in terms of the individual's (a) opportunity to commit to their partner, (b) the cost of dissolving committed partnerships, and (c) the distribution of these dissolution costs between partners. Our findings show that pledges of commitment alone can increase cooperation and welfare in committed partnerships. The introduction of relatively large and equally split costs yields similar gains. In contrast, when costs to dissolve committed partnerships fall solely on the individual choosing to break up, pledges of commitment fail to improve cooperation and welfare.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 201 [rev.]
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Public Goods
- Thema
-
Commitment
Cooperation
Endogenous Group Formation
Experiment
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Deer, Lachlan
Bayer, Ralph-C.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Zurich, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Zurich
- (wann)
-
2015
- DOI
-
doi:10.5167/uzh-111831
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Deer, Lachlan
- Bayer, Ralph-C.
- University of Zurich, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2015
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