The Logic of Deterrence

Abstract: This article describes the important structural characteristics of a recently developed game-theoretic model of deterrence, summarizes the major deductions drown from it, and discusses its implications for both the theory of deterrence and the current strategic relationship of the superpowers. The model shows that a credible threat and a power advantage are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for stable deterrence. It also suggests that, even under ideal conditions, deterrence is an intricate and fundamentally fragile relationship that rests, ultimately, upon the preferences and perceptions of key decision-makers rather than upon the nature and composition of each side’s strategic arsenal.

Object Details

• Location: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
• Extent: Online-Ressource
• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: The Logic of Deterrence ; volume:9 ; number:1-2 ; year:1987 ; pages:47-61 ; extent:15 ; Analyse & Kritik ; 9, Heft 1-2 (1987), 47-61 (gesamt 15)

Contributors, Places and Time

• Creator: Zagare, Frank C.

Further information

• DOI: 10.1515/auk-1987-1-202
• URN: urn:nbn:de:101:1-2404171546058.346917315406
• Rights: Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
• Last update: 14.08.2025, 10:44 AM CEST