Arbeitspapier
Optimal Procurement Auction for a Buyer with Downward Sloping Demand: More Simple Economics
A buyer with downward slopping demand faces a number of unit supply sellers. The paper characterizes optimal auctions in this setting. For the symmetric case, a uniform auction (with price equal to lowest rejected offer) is optimal when complemented with reserve prices for different quantities acquired. For asymmetric sellers, the optimal distortions are familiar. The problem is similar to the third degree discriminating monopsonist problem, just as in the unit (flat) demand case (Bulow-Roberts, 1989), and when the number of sellers (and the demand) grows their outcomes approach at the speed of the law of large numbers.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 144.2004
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Auctions
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Monopoly
- Subject
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Auctions
Monopsony
Auktionstheorie
Beschaffung
Monopson
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Burguet, Roberto
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (where)
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Milano
- (when)
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2004
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Burguet, Roberto
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Time of origin
- 2004