Arbeitspapier

Optimal Procurement Auction for a Buyer with Downward Sloping Demand: More Simple Economics

A buyer with downward slopping demand faces a number of unit supply sellers. The paper characterizes optimal auctions in this setting. For the symmetric case, a uniform auction (with price equal to lowest rejected offer) is optimal when complemented with reserve prices for different quantities acquired. For asymmetric sellers, the optimal distortions are familiar. The problem is similar to the third degree discriminating monopsonist problem, just as in the unit (flat) demand case (Bulow-Roberts, 1989), and when the number of sellers (and the demand) grows their outcomes approach at the speed of the law of large numbers.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 144.2004

Classification
Wirtschaft
Auctions
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Monopoly
Subject
Auctions
Monopsony
Auktionstheorie
Beschaffung
Monopson

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Burguet, Roberto
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(where)
Milano
(when)
2004

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Burguet, Roberto
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Time of origin

  • 2004

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