Infrastructure quality in deregulated industries: Is there an underinvestment problem

Arbeitspapier

We investigate how various institutional settings affect a network provider's incentives to invest in infrastructure quality. Under reasonable assumptions on demand, investment incentives turn out to be smaller under vertical separation than under vertical integration, though we also provide counter-examples. The introduction of downstream competition for the market can sometimes improve incentives. With suitable non-linear access prices investment incentives under separation become identical to those under integration.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Paper ; No. 0209

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Monopoly ; Firm Organization and Market Structure ; Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation ; Railroads and Other Surface Transportation
• Subject: investment incentives ; networks ; quality ; vertical externality ; Versorgungswirtschaft ; Investition ; Institutionelle Infrastruktur ; Deregulierung ; Privatisierung ; Theorie ; Netzinfrastruktur

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Buehler, Stefan ; Schmutzler, Armin ; Benz, Men-Andri
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute
• (where): Zurich
• (when): 2002

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/76245
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET