Arbeitspapier

Infrastructure quality in deregulated industries: Is there an underinvestment problem

We investigate how various institutional settings affect a network provider's incentives to invest in infrastructure quality. Under reasonable assumptions on demand, investment incentives turn out to be smaller under vertical separation than under vertical integration, though we also provide counter-examples. The introduction of downstream competition for the market can sometimes improve incentives. With suitable non-linear access prices investment incentives under separation become identical to those under integration.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 0209

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Monopoly
Firm Organization and Market Structure
Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
Railroads and Other Surface Transportation
Thema
investment incentives
networks
quality
vertical externality
Versorgungswirtschaft
Investition
Institutionelle Infrastruktur
Deregulierung
Privatisierung
Theorie
Netzinfrastruktur

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Buehler, Stefan
Schmutzler, Armin
Benz, Men-Andri
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute
(wo)
Zurich
(wann)
2002

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Buehler, Stefan
  • Schmutzler, Armin
  • Benz, Men-Andri
  • University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute

Entstanden

  • 2002

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