Arbeitspapier
Intergovernmental Transfers and Pareto Optimality
This paper will examine a variety of models in which the affected governments modify their behavior in response to spillover benefits. Initiallly, governments will adjust to the 'income effects' of benefit spill-ins, but it will be shown that intergovernmental compensation will generally be required in order to achieve Pareto optimality.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Queen's Economics Department Working Paper ; No. 38
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Vardy, David Allan
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Queen's University, Department of Economics
- (where)
-
Kingston (Ontario)
- (when)
-
1972
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Vardy, David Allan
- Queen's University, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 1972
Other Objects (12)
Pareto-Optimality and Desirability Indices
Unanimity Games and Pareto Optimality
Pareto-optimality in linear public goods games
Full and constrained Pareto optimality with incomplete financial markets
Asset pricing implications of Pareto optimality with private information
Pareto-Improving Intergenerational Transfers
Pareto meets Olson: A note on Pareto-optimality and group size in linear public goods games
Distributional Effects of Intergovernmental Transfers in Mexico
Pareto improvements by in-kind-transfers
Federal tax-transfer policy and intergovernmental pre-commitment
Pareto optimality in the extraction of fossil fuels and the greenhouse effect: a note
A Note on Externality Benefits and the Feasibilty of Pareto Optimality through Unilateral Subsidies
Pareto-Optimality and Desirability Indices
Unanimity Games and Pareto Optimality
Pareto-optimality in linear public goods games
Full and constrained Pareto optimality with incomplete financial markets
Asset pricing implications of Pareto optimality with private information
Pareto-Improving Intergenerational Transfers
Pareto meets Olson: A note on Pareto-optimality and group size in linear public goods games
Distributional Effects of Intergovernmental Transfers in Mexico
Pareto improvements by in-kind-transfers
Federal tax-transfer policy and intergovernmental pre-commitment
Pareto optimality in the extraction of fossil fuels and the greenhouse effect: a note
A Note on Externality Benefits and the Feasibilty of Pareto Optimality through Unilateral Subsidies
Pareto-Optimality and Desirability Indices
Unanimity Games and Pareto Optimality
Pareto-optimality in linear public goods games
Full and constrained Pareto optimality with incomplete financial markets
Asset pricing implications of Pareto optimality with private information
Pareto-Improving Intergenerational Transfers
Pareto meets Olson: A note on Pareto-optimality and group size in linear public goods games
Distributional Effects of Intergovernmental Transfers in Mexico
Pareto improvements by in-kind-transfers
Federal tax-transfer policy and intergovernmental pre-commitment
Pareto optimality in the extraction of fossil fuels and the greenhouse effect: a note