Bayesian comparative statics

Arbeitspapier

We study how information affects equilibria and welfare in games. For an agent, more precise information about an unknown state of the world leads to a mean-preserving spread of beliefs. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions to obtain either a non-increasing mean or a non-decreasing-mean spread of actions whenever information precision increases for at least one agent. We apply our Bayesian comparative statics framework to study informational externalities in strategic environments. In persuasion games, we derive sufficient conditions that lead to extremal disclosure of information. In oligopolistic markets, we characterize the incentives of firms to share information. In macroeconomic models, we show that information not only drives the amplitude of business cycles but also affects aggregate output.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Papers ; No. 2019-03

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Operations Research; Statistical Decision Theory ; Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Monopoly ; Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
• Subject: Comparative Statics ; Information Acquisition ; Information Orders ; Persuasion ; Value of Information ; Supermodular Games

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Leal Vizcaíno, René ; Mekonnen, Teddy
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Banco de México
• (where): Ciudad de México
• (when): 2019

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/240671
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET