Arbeitspapier
Bayesian comparative statics
We study how information affects equilibria and welfare in games. For an agent, more precise information about an unknown state of the world leads to a mean-preserving spread of beliefs. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions to obtain either a non-increasing mean or a non-decreasing-mean spread of actions whenever information precision increases for at least one agent. We apply our Bayesian comparative statics framework to study informational externalities in strategic environments. In persuasion games, we derive sufficient conditions that lead to extremal disclosure of information. In oligopolistic markets, we characterize the incentives of firms to share information. In macroeconomic models, we show that information not only drives the amplitude of business cycles but also affects aggregate output.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Working Papers ; No. 2019-03
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Operations Research; Statistical Decision Theory
Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Monopoly
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- Thema
-
Comparative Statics
Information Acquisition
Information Orders
Persuasion
Value of Information
Supermodular Games
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Leal Vizcaíno, René
Mekonnen, Teddy
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Banco de México
- (wo)
-
Ciudad de México
- (wann)
-
2019
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Leal Vizcaíno, René
- Mekonnen, Teddy
- Banco de México
Entstanden
- 2019