Arbeitspapier

Bayesian comparative statics

We study how information affects equilibria and welfare in games. For an agent, more precise information about an unknown state of the world leads to a mean-preserving spread of beliefs. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions to obtain either a non-increasing mean or a non-decreasing-mean spread of actions whenever information precision increases for at least one agent. We apply our Bayesian comparative statics framework to study informational externalities in strategic environments. In persuasion games, we derive sufficient conditions that lead to extremal disclosure of information. In oligopolistic markets, we characterize the incentives of firms to share information. In macroeconomic models, we show that information not only drives the amplitude of business cycles but also affects aggregate output.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Papers ; No. 2019-03

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Operations Research; Statistical Decision Theory
Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Monopoly
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Thema
Comparative Statics
Information Acquisition
Information Orders
Persuasion
Value of Information
Supermodular Games

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Leal Vizcaíno, René
Mekonnen, Teddy
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Banco de México
(wo)
Ciudad de México
(wann)
2019

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Leal Vizcaíno, René
  • Mekonnen, Teddy
  • Banco de México

Entstanden

  • 2019

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