Optimal discounts in Green Public Procurement

Arbeitspapier

We consider a Green Public Procurement setting where the procurer provides a bid discount to environment-friendly technologies to foster their use. We assume that, before the auction, firms may switch to green technology via a publicly observable costly investment. We show that investment acts as a signaling device. This mitigates the effect of incomplete information on firms' costs, thereby triggering more competitive bidding, which results in lower prices for the procurer. Therefore, even a procurer with no preference toward green technology can find it optimal to use a discount. Our results challenge the common perception that Green Public Procurement always implies a trade-off between environmental performance and purchasing price.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: DIW Discussion Papers ; No. 1983

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Auctions ; National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Procurement ; Environmental Economics: Government Policy ; Environmental Economics: Technological Innovation
• Thema: Public Procurement ; Environmental Policy ; Auctions

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Chiappinelli, Olga ; Seres, Gyula
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
• (wo): Berlin
• (wann): 2021

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/248486
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ