Informal benchmarks as a source of regulatory threat in unregulated utility sectors

Arbeitspapier

This paper investigates to what extent unregulated local monopolies attempt not to evoke the introduction of a formal price regulation by conforming to customers' and authorities' expectations. It is argued that utilities can meet expectations by setting prices that imitate neighbours' prices. The empirical evaluation rests on a cross-sectional data set representing all Swedish district heating utilities, and on a flexible nonlinear IV specification. It is found that while utilities' price setting schemes are insensitive to customer complaints, they are significantly influenced by the passive monitoring by authorities. The spillover effect from the 5-6 closest neighbours is around 40 %.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2973

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms ; Comparison of Public and Private Enterprises and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out ; Utilities: General
• Thema: regulatory threat ; spatial correlation ; price ; district heating ; Sweden ; Heizkraftwerk ; Betriebliche Preispolitik ; Regionale Preisstruktur ; Erwartungstheorie ; Staatliche Preispolitik ; Schweden

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Söderberg, Magnus
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2010

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30754
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ