International organizations and the Theory of Clubs

Artikel

This paper focuses on international organizations, especially those regulat-ing trade and exchange. It draws on the Theory of Clubs (Buchanan, 1965) and builds a model that aims to explain governments' optimal choices when joining international organizations. The results of the model show that governmental willingness to enlarge international organizations and to increase their degree of commitment are decreasing functions of both, the size of the organization, and the country's degree of commitment and of national heterogeneity.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Journal: Revista de Métodos Cuantitativos para la Economía y la Empresa ; ISSN: 1886-516X ; Volume: 09 ; Year: 2010 ; Pages: 17-27 ; Sevilla: Universidad Pablo de Olavide

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
• Subject: Theory of Clubs ; international economic organizations ; benefits and costs of the governments' choices ; Internationale Organisation ; Clubtheorie ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Faíña Medín, José Andrés ; García Lorenzo, Antonio ; López-Rodríguez, Jesús
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Universidad Pablo de Olavide
• (where): Sevilla
• (when): 2010

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59077
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET