Arbeitspapier

Downstream mode of competition with upstream market power

In a two-tier oligopoly, where the downstream firms are locked in pair-wise exclusive relationships with their upstream input suppliers, the equilibrium mode of competition in the downstream market is endogenously determined as a renegotiation-proof contract signed between each downstream firm and its exclusive upstream input supplier. We find that the upstream-downstream exclusive relationships credibly sustain the Cournot (Bertrand) mode of competition in the downstream market, when the goods are substitutes (complements). In contrast to previous studies, this result holds irrespectively of the degree of product differentiation and the distribution of bargaining power between the upstream and the downstream firm, over the pairspecific input price.

ISBN
978-3-86304-117-5
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: DICE Discussion Paper ; No. 118

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
Thema
Oligopoly
Vertical relations
Wholesale prices
Equilibrium mode of competition

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Manasakis, Constantine
Vlassis, Minas
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
(wo)
Düsseldorf
(wann)
2013

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Manasakis, Constantine
  • Vlassis, Minas
  • Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

Entstanden

  • 2013

Ähnliche Objekte (12)