Fiscal disparity, institutions and asymmetric yardstick competition

Arbeitspapier

Fiscal disparity leads to a yardstick bias, in that incumbents in fiscally-rich jurisdictions can provide more public goods, extract more rents and yet have a higher probability to be reelected. This study further emphasizes disparity among jurisdictions, not only in terms of fiscal resources but also of costs of rent appropriation. In a setting in which jurisdictions with a higher fiscal capacity have lower costs of rent appropriation whilst those with a lower fiscal capacity have higher costs of rent appropriation, the difference in costs of rent appropriation might moderate the bias caused by the fiscal disparity.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CIW Discussion Paper ; No. 2/2018

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue ; State and Local Budget and Expenditures ; Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
• Thema: accountability ; rent ; fiscal capacity ; institutions ; yardstick competition

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Farah, Alfa
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Centrum für Interdisziplinäre Wirtschaftsforschung (CIW)
• (wo): Münster
• (wann): 2018

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/179283
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ