Fiscal disparity, institutions and asymmetric yardstick competition

Arbeitspapier

Fiscal disparity leads to a yardstick bias, in that incumbents in fiscally-rich jurisdictions can provide more public goods, extract more rents and yet have a higher probability to be reelected. This study further emphasizes disparity among jurisdictions, not only in terms of fiscal resources but also of costs of rent appropriation. In a setting in which jurisdictions with a higher fiscal capacity have lower costs of rent appropriation whilst those with a lower fiscal capacity have higher costs of rent appropriation, the difference in costs of rent appropriation might moderate the bias caused by the fiscal disparity.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CIW Discussion Paper ; No. 2/2018

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue ; State and Local Budget and Expenditures ; Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
• Subject: accountability ; rent ; fiscal capacity ; institutions ; yardstick competition

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Farah, Alfa
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Centrum für Interdisziplinäre Wirtschaftsforschung (CIW)
• (where): Münster
• (when): 2018

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/179283
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET