Arbeitspapier

Political Economy of Fiscal Institutions

We discuss two essential problems of the political economy of public finances: The principal agent problem between voters and elected politicians and the common pool problem arising from the fact that money drawn from a general tax fund is used to pay for policies targeting more or less narrow groups in society. Three institutional mechanisms exist to deal with these problems, ex-ante rules controlling the behavior of elected policy makers, electoral rules creating accountability of and competition among policy makers, and budgeting processes internalizing the common pool externality. We review recent theoretical and empirical research and discuss its implications for research and institutional design.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 149

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
National Budget; Budget Systems
National Deficit; Surplus
Thema
electoral systems
fiscal rules
budgeting processes

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
von Hagen, Jürgen
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
(wo)
München
(wann)
2005

DOI
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13402
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13402-2
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • von Hagen, Jürgen
  • Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)

Entstanden

  • 2005

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