Matching with Waiting Times: The German Entry-Level Labor Market for Lawyers

Arbeitspapier

We study the allocation of German lawyers to regional courts for legal trainee-ships. Because of excess demand in some regions lawyers often have to wait before being allocated. The currently used \"Berlin\" mechanism is not weakly Pareto efficient, does not eliminate justified envy and does not respect improvements. We introduce a mechanism based on the matching with contracts literature, using waiting time as the contractual term. The resulting mechanism is strategy-proof, weakly Pareto efficient, eliminates justified envy and respects improvements. We extend our proposed mechanism to allow for a more flexible allocation of positions over time.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 68

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Market Design ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; State and Local Government: Health; Education; Welfare; Public Pensions ; Education: Government Policy
• Subject: many-to-one matching ; matching with contracts ; stability ; slot-specific choice functions ; waiting time ; legal education

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Dimakopoulos, Philipp D. ; Heller, C.-Philipp
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition
• (where): München und Berlin
• (when): 2018

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/185738
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET