Matching with Waiting Times: The German Entry-Level Labour Market for Lawyers

Konferenzbeitrag

We study the allocation of German lawyers to different regional courts for their compulsory legal traineeship. The number of applicants exceeds the number of available positions in a given time period in some regions, so that not all lawyers can be matched simultaneously. As a consequence some lawyers have to wait before they obtain a position. First, we analyse the currently used Berlin mechanism and demonstrate that it is unfair and that it does not respect improvements. Second, we introduce a matching with contracts model, using waiting time as the contractual term, for which we suggest an appropriate choice function for the courts that respects the capacity constraints of each court for each period. Despite the failure of the unilateral substitutes condition, under a weak assumption on lawyers preferences, a lawyer-optimal stable allocation exists. Using existing results, we can show that the resulting mechanism is strategy-proof, fair and respects improvements. Third, we extend our proposed mechanism to allow for a more flexible allocation of positions over time.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2015: Ökonomische Entwicklung - Theorie und Politik - Session: Mechanism Design ; No. B20-V1

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Market Design ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Dimakopoulos, Philipp D. ; Heller, C.-Philipp
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wann): 2015

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/113153
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ