Arbeitspapier

Why pay taxes when no one else does?

Previous papers tested the validity of the Family Investment Hypothesis (FIH) among immigrants by comparing the labor market outcomes of immigrant couples and native or mixed couples. Here we propose an alternative test for the FIH which is based on a comparison between married and single immigrants. The logic underlying this alternative method states that if credit constraints are binding, then only married immigrants can cross-finance their investment within the family. In order to overcome potential selection bias that would arise if unobserved characteristics that affect the marital status of the individual also affect his/her labor market outcomes, we construct a difference-in-differences estimator that exploits variation in the labor market outcomes of married and single natives. Implementation of this method using US and Israeli data leads to a rejection of the FIH in both countries.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2009-13

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
Steuervermeidung
Steuerstrafrecht
Entscheidung bei Unsicherheit
Erwartungsnutzen
Herdenverhalten
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Epstein, Gil S.
Gang, Ira N.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics
(where)
Ramat-Gan
(when)
2009

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Epstein, Gil S.
  • Gang, Ira N.
  • Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics

Time of origin

  • 2009

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