Arbeitspapier
Constrained discretion and central bank transparency
We develop and estimate a general equilibrium model in which monetary policy can deviate from active in.ation stabilization and agents face uncertainty about the nature of these deviations. When observing a deviation, agents conduct Bayesian learning to infer its likely duration. Under constrained discretion, only short deviations occur: Agents are con.dent about a prompt return to the active regime, macroeconomic uncertainty is low, welfare is high. However, if a deviation persists, agents.beliefs start drifting, uncertainty accelerates, and welfare declines. If the duration of the deviations is announced, uncertainty follows a reverse path. For the U.S. transparency lowers uncertainty and increases welfare.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2014-16
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Monetary Policy
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Bayesian Analysis: General
- Thema
-
Geldpolitik
Politische Kommunikation
Reputation
Regelbindung versus Diskretion
Inflationserwartung
Prospect Theory
Inflationsbekämpfung
Theorie
USA
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Bianchi, Francesco
Melosi, Leonardo
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
- (wo)
-
Chicago, IL
- (wann)
-
2014
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Bianchi, Francesco
- Melosi, Leonardo
- Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Entstanden
- 2014
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