Arbeitspapier
Takeovers and Cooperatives
If consumers wholly or partially control a firm with market power they will charge less than the profit maximising price. Starting at the usual monopoly price, a small price reduction will have a second order effect on profits but a first order effect on consumer surplus. Despite this desirable static result, it has been argued that cooperatives are vulnerable to take-over by outsiders who will run them as for-profit businesses. This paper studies takeovers of cooperatives. We argue that cooperatives are in fact quite stable due to the Grossman-Hart problem of free riding during takeovers.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Queen's Economics Department Working Paper ; No. 1113
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior: General
- Thema
-
corporate governance
co-operative
take-over
free-rider
Corporate Governance
Übernahme
Unternehmenskooperation
Trittbrettfahrerverhalten
Externer Effekt
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Milne, Frank
Kelsey, David
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Queen's University, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Kingston (Ontario)
- (wann)
-
2006
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Milne, Frank
- Kelsey, David
- Queen's University, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2006
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