Iterative versus standard deferred acceptance: Experimental evidence

Arbeitspapier

We run laboratory experiments where subjects are matched to colleges, and colleges are not strategic agents. We test the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism versus the Iterative Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (IDAM), a matching mechanism based on a new family of procedures being used in the field, in which information about tentative allocations is provided while students make choices. We consider two variations of IDAM: one in which they are only informed about whether they are tentatively accepted or not (IDAM-NC) and one in which students are additionally informed at each step of the tentative cutoff values for acceptance at each school (IDAM). A significantly higher proportion of stable outcomes is reached both under IDAM and IDAM-NC than under DA. The difference can be explained by a higher proportion of subjects following an equilibrium strategy akin to truthful behavior under IDAM and IDAM-NC than truthful behavior itself under DA. Moreover, the provision of intermediate cutoff values in IDAM leads to higher rates of equilibrium behavior than in IDAM-NC and a higher robustness of stability between the rounds of experiments. Our findings provide substantial support for the rising practice of using iterative mechanisms in centralized college admissions in practice.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. SP II 2016-209

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior ; Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
• Subject: Market Design ; Matching ; Iterative Mechanisms ; College Admissions ; Experiments

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Bó, Inácio ; Hakimov, Rustamdjan
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
• (where): Berlin
• (when): 2016

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/148566
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET