Arbeitspapier

Welfare, employment, and hours of work

We use the Pissarides (2000) model to show how social benefits and increased bargaining power of workers can both cause high unemployment and short hours of work. While his matching model has been used to explain higher unemployment in Europe than in the United States, we augment it to account for another observation, which is the fewer hours of work in Europe. We derive an explicit wage curve with variable hours of work that captures wages (per hour) as a function of hours of work. This enables us to show why higher social benefits and greater bargaining power of workers have the dual effect of making workers prefer more leisure time and discouraging firms from offering vacancies.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper Series ; No. W20:01

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Labor Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs
Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
Thema
Job search
unemployment
working hours

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Hall, Axel
Gylfi Zoega
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Iceland, Institute of Economic Studies (IoES)
(wo)
Reykjavik
(wann)
2020

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Hall, Axel
  • Gylfi Zoega
  • University of Iceland, Institute of Economic Studies (IoES)

Entstanden

  • 2020

Ähnliche Objekte (12)