Arbeitspapier

Wage bargaining and management opposition in the presence of productivity gains and organization costs

Empirical studies have emphasized three important factors in firm-labor relationships: (a) organization costs of workers, (b) management opposition against workers' organizing drives, (c) the possibility of productivity enhancing effects due to voice/response reasons. In this paper the interplay of all three issues is simultaneously analyzed. The possibility of forgone productivity gains puts an upper bound on management opposition against organizing drives of the workers, even if management opposition is cost-less. Strategic gift exchange - less opposition for higher productivity - plays a crucial role. Decreasing productivity gains and increasing the firm's bargaining power lowers management opposition. The equilibrium wage is above the workers' reservation wage.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Reihe Ökonomie / Economics Series ; No. 49

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining: General
Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
Thema
wage bargaining
management opposition
productivity gains
organization costs
Lohnverhandlungstheorie
Gewerkschaftsmitgliedschaft
Betriebsrat
Management
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Riedl, Arno
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS)
(wo)
Vienna
(wann)
1997

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:21 MESZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Riedl, Arno
  • Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS)

Entstanden

  • 1997

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