Arbeitspapier
Wage bargaining and management opposition in the presence of productivity gains and organization costs
Empirical studies have emphasized three important factors in firm-labor relationships: (a) organization costs of workers, (b) management opposition against workers' organizing drives, (c) the possibility of productivity enhancing effects due to voice/response reasons. In this paper the interplay of all three issues is simultaneously analyzed. The possibility of forgone productivity gains puts an upper bound on management opposition against organizing drives of the workers, even if management opposition is cost-less. Strategic gift exchange - less opposition for higher productivity - plays a crucial role. Decreasing productivity gains and increasing the firm's bargaining power lowers management opposition. The equilibrium wage is above the workers' reservation wage.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Reihe Ökonomie / Economics Series ; No. 49
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining: General
Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
- Thema
-
wage bargaining
management opposition
productivity gains
organization costs
Lohnverhandlungstheorie
Gewerkschaftsmitgliedschaft
Betriebsrat
Management
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Riedl, Arno
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS)
- (wo)
-
Vienna
- (wann)
-
1997
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:21 MESZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Riedl, Arno
- Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS)
Entstanden
- 1997