Comparative politics of strategic voting: a hierarchy of electoral systems

Abstract: "What is the impact of electoral rules on the way people make decisions in the voting booth? Institutional incentives moderate a voter’s expectation formation process and, therefore, make the frequency of strategic voters predictable across a wide range of electoral systems. I provide evidence that there is a latent dimension of propensity to cast a strategic vote following the wasted-vote logic on which various seat-allocation systems can be placed even controlling for district magnitude. Thus the variance of vote-to-seat conversion mechanisms is far more important in determining the level of strategic voting across electoral systems than previously thought." (author's abstract)

Object Details

• Location: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
• Extent: Online-Ressource, 30 S.
• Language: Englisch
• Notes: Veröffentlichungsversion

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Politik
• Keyword: Wahlverhalten ; Wahlsystem

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (where): Mannheim
• (when): 2006
• Creator: Gschwend, Thomas

Further information

• URN: urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-257715
• Rights: Open Access unbekannt; Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
• Last update: 25.03.2025, 1:43 PM CET