Arbeitspapier

Abstract Equilibria, Interactive Choice Sets and Walrasian Allocations

Consider an exchange economy with a finite number of agents, who are arbitragers, in that they try to upset allocations imagining plausible beneficial trades. Their thought process is interactive, in that agents are conscious that the others are also going through the same steps. With this introspective process, each agent constructs a supermarket, i.e., a set of bundles that he considers achievable, in the sense that a sequence of plausible trades with other agents yields those bundles. We shed additional light on a result of Dagan (1996), by showing that Walrasian allocations can be characterized also as those where each agent chooses optimally from his supermarket. In addition, we extend the analysis to economies without short sales, where the characterization of Walrasian allocations is also obtained. Our analysis provides a different behavioral assumption for Walrasian allocations and connects with the core convergence theorem.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 1997-09

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Serrano, Roberto
Volij, Oscar
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Brown University, Department of Economics
(wo)
Providence, RI
(wann)
1998

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Serrano, Roberto
  • Volij, Oscar
  • Brown University, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 1998

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