Policy diffusion in a simple Stackelberg game

Arbeitspapier

Strategic environmental policy games are usually based on simultaneous decision making and reach the conclusion that the policy choices are strategic substitutes. Empirical evidence, however, shows that the introduction of a regulatory instrument usually follows a consecutive pattern that is best described as policy diffusion. To introduce policy diffusion into to a strategic environmental policy game we transform the typical model setup into a Stackelberg game in which we analyze the policy decisions of two governments when one can commit to its choice. We find that the well-known trade-off between rent-seeking and the internalisation of negative externalities from pollution is mitigated when policy diffusion takes place.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsreihe ; No. 314

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Trade and Environment ; Externalities ; Environmental Economics: Government Policy
• Thema: Strategic environmental policy ; policy diffusion ; emission tax ; Umweltpolitik ; Zwei-Länder-Modell ; Spieltheorie ; Ökosteuer ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Michaelis, Peter ; Ziesemer, Thomas
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Universität Augsburg, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre
• (wo): Augsburg
• (wann): 2010

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/70083
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ