Artikel
Tax evasion under behavioral structures
We study the strategic interactions between the fiscal authority and the taxpayer regarding tax evasion and auditing. We fit this interaction into a Bayesian game and introduce the concept of behavioral consistency, which helps reducing the number of available strategies and models the stylized fact according to which the choice to evade is subject to behavioral patterns.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: EconomiA ; ISSN: 1517-7580 ; Volume: 15 ; Year: 2014 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 30-40 ; Amsterdam: Elsevier
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Noncooperative Games
- Subject
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Tax evasion
Bayesian equilibrium
Behavioral consistency
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Pantoja, Gabriela S.
Penaloza, Rodrigo S.
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Elsevier
- (where)
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Amsterdam
- (when)
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2014
- DOI
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doi:10.1016/j.econ.2014.03.002
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Pantoja, Gabriela S.
- Penaloza, Rodrigo S.
- Elsevier
Time of origin
- 2014