Artikel

Tax evasion under behavioral structures

We study the strategic interactions between the fiscal authority and the taxpayer regarding tax evasion and auditing. We fit this interaction into a Bayesian game and introduce the concept of behavioral consistency, which helps reducing the number of available strategies and models the stylized fact according to which the choice to evade is subject to behavioral patterns.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: EconomiA ; ISSN: 1517-7580 ; Volume: 15 ; Year: 2014 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 30-40 ; Amsterdam: Elsevier

Classification
Wirtschaft
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Noncooperative Games
Subject
Tax evasion
Bayesian equilibrium
Behavioral consistency

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Pantoja, Gabriela S.
Penaloza, Rodrigo S.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Elsevier
(where)
Amsterdam
(when)
2014

DOI
doi:10.1016/j.econ.2014.03.002
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Pantoja, Gabriela S.
  • Penaloza, Rodrigo S.
  • Elsevier

Time of origin

  • 2014

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