Arbeitspapier

Divided they fall: Fragmented parliaments and government stability

This paper studies how political fragmentation affects government stability. We show that each additional party with representation in Parliament increases the probability that the incumbent government is unseated by 4 percentage points. Governments with more resources at their disposal for bargaining are less likely to be replaced. When they are, new government leaders are younger and better educated, suggesting instability may induce positive selection. We interpret our results in light of a bargaining model of coalition formation featuring government instability. Our findings indicate that the rising fragmentation in parliaments worldwide may have a substantial impact on stability and political selection.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2020:1

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Regional Government Analysis: General
Thema
Government Stability
Fragmentation
No-confidence votes
Bargaining
Alignment effect

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Carozzi, Felipe
Cipullo, Davide
Repetto, Luca
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Uppsala University, Department of Economics
(wo)
Uppsala
(wann)
2020

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-407544
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Carozzi, Felipe
  • Cipullo, Davide
  • Repetto, Luca
  • Uppsala University, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2020

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