Artikel

The political economy of income taxation under asymmetric information: The two-type case

The apparent ubiquity of progressive taxation in advanced democracies has animated research by political economists in the past decade, but little progress has been made in modeling political equilibria over tax policy when labor supply is elastic with respect to taxation. Here, we postulate an economy with two worker types (wage capacities), in which the unskilled are more numerous than the skilled. Preferences are quasi-linear in income and leisure. One political party represents each worker type. A tax policy is any feasible incentive-compatible menu of pre- and posttax incomes from which each worker must choose. This policy space is three-dimensional. Workers vote stochastically. The equilibrium concept for political competition is party-unanimity Nash equilibrium (PUNE)thus, parties are both vote-seeking and representative. The set of political equilibria is characterized.We prove that, if the class of unskilled workers is not too large (but greater than one-half), then there always exist equilibria in which a regressive tax policy wins. If, however, that class is sufficiently numerous, or inequality is sufficiently great, then the victory of a progressive policy is guaranteed in all equilibria.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association ; ISSN: 1869-4195 ; Volume: 3 ; Year: 2012 ; Issue: 1/2 ; Pages: 181-199 ; Heidelberg: Springer

Classification
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Subject
progressive taxation
PUNE
asymmetric information
mirrlees tax problem
Steuerprogression
Einkommensteuer
Optimale Besteuerung
Nash-Gleichgewicht
Neue politische Ökonomie
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Roemer, John E.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Springer
(where)
Heidelberg
(when)
2012

DOI
doi:10.1007/s13209-011-0047-6
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

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Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Roemer, John E.
  • Springer

Time of origin

  • 2012

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