Arbeitspapier

Voluntary export restraints in a trade model with sticky price: Linear and nonlinear feedback solutions

We revisit the adoption of voluntary export restraints (VERS) in the differential Cournot game with sticky price and intraindustry trade by Dockner and Haug (1991). The analysis relies on linear and nonlinear feedback strategies, to encompass the special cases considered in Fujiwara (2010) and to show that a VER may arise in correspondence of any free trade equilibrium generated by feedback information such that competition is at least as strong as under open-loop rules. This result can be interpreted in the light of the dynamic formulation of conjectural variations due to Dockner (1992).

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 1109

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Thema
differential games
intraindustry trade
VER
conjectural variations

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Lambertini, Luca
Palestini, Arsen
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
(wo)
Bologna
(wann)
2017

DOI
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5715
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Lambertini, Luca
  • Palestini, Arsen
  • Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)

Entstanden

  • 2017

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