Schelling's spatial proximity model of segregation revisited

Arbeitspapier

Schelling [1969, 1971a, 1971b, 1978] presented a microeconomic model showing how an integrated city could unravel to a rather segregated city, notwithstanding relatively mild assumptions concerning the individual agents' preferences, i.e., no agent preferring the resulting segregation. We examine the robustness of Schelling's model, focusing in particular on its driving force: the individual preferences. We show that even if all individual agents have a strict preference for perfect integration, best-response dynamics will lead to segregation. What is more, we argue that the one-dimensional and two-dimensional versions of Schelling's spatial proximity model are in fact two qualitatively very different models of segregation.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Paper ; No. 487

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games ; Externalities
• Subject: Neighborhood segregation, Myopic Nash Equilibria, Best-response dynamics, Markov chain, Limit-behavior ; Wohnstandort ; Präferenztheorie ; Markovscher Prozess ; Segregation

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Pancs, Romans ; Vriend, Nicolaas J.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Queen Mary University of London, Department of Economics
• (where): London
• (when): 2003

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62787
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET