Arbeitspapier

Institutional Effects in a Simple Model of Educational Production

The paper presents a model of educational production which tries to make sense of recent evidence on effects of institutional arrangements on student performance. In a simple principal-agent framework, students choose their learning effort to maximize their net benefits, while the government chooses educational spending to maximize its net benefits. In the jointly determined equilibrium, schooling quality is shown to depend on several institutionally determined parameters. The impact on student performance of institutions such as central examinations, centralization versus school autonomy, teachers' influence, parental influence, and competition from private schools is analyzed. Furthermore, the model can rationalize why positive resource effects may be lacking in educational production.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 484

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
National Government Expenditures and Education
Public Enterprises; Public-Private Enterprises
Education and Research Institutions: General
Thema
educational production
principal-agent model
institutions of the education system
Bildungsökonomik
Institutionalismus
Bildungsniveau
Bildungsverhalten
Bildungspolitik
Agency Theory
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Bishop, John H.
Woessmann, Ludger
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2002

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Bishop, John H.
  • Woessmann, Ludger
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2002

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