Simultaneous inter- and intra-group conflicts

Arbeitspapier

This paper models the trade-off between production and appropriation in the presence of simultaneous inter- and intra-group conflicts. The model exhibits a 'group cohesion effect': if the contest between the groups becomes more decisive, or contractual incompleteness between groups becomes more serious, the players devote fewer resources to the intra-group conflict. Moreover, there is also a 'reversed group cohesion effect': if the intra-group contests become less decisive, or contractual incompleteness within groups becomes less serious, the players devote more resources to the inter-group contest. The model also sheds new light on normative questions. I derive exact conditions for when dividing individuals in more groups leads to more productive and less appropriative activities. Furthermore, I show that there is an optimal size of the organization which is determined by a trade-off between increasing returns to scale in production and increasing costs of appropriative activities.

Object Details

• Alternative title: Simultane Konflikte innerhalb und zwischen Gruppen
• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. SP II 2005-08

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions ; Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government ; State and Local Borrowing
• Subject: Conflict ; rent-seeking ; federalism ; hierarchy

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Münster, Johannes
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
• (where): Berlin
• (when): 2005

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51140
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET