Information, Polarization and Delegation in Democracy

Arbeitspapier

This paper investigates the merits of different democratic institutions when politics is uni-dimensional, there is uncertainty both about the preferences of the future electorate and the future polarization of political parties, and politicians have better information about the state of the world than voters. Three types of institutions are compared: direct democracy, representative democracy, where politicians are accountable and independent agencies, where they are not. Low uncertainty about the state of the world and the future electorate's preferences and high expected polarization make direct democracy optimal, while the opposite configuration makes representative democracy optimal. Independent agencies are optimal for intermediate values.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1104

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Structure and Scope of Government: General ; State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: General ; Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior: General
• Thema: accountability ; redistribution ; constitutional design ; voting ; information ; direct democracy

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Schultz, Christian
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2003

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/76609
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ