Strategic Campaigns and Redistributive Politics

Arbeitspapier

The paper investigates strategic campaigning in a model of redistributive politics in a society with many groups and two parties. Campaigns are informative, and parties can target campaigns to different groups. Voters are uncertain about whether parties favor special groups. The parties will seek to target campaigns at groups where most votes are gained by informing about policies. In equilibrium campaigning will be most intensive in groups where the uncertainty is largest and where voters are most mobile. These groups will therefore be very well informed about policy and will accordingly be favored by the parties' policies.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: EPRU Working Paper Series ; No. 2003-03

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Publicly Provided Goods: General
• Subject: political economy ; redistribution ; information ; Spieltheorie ; Verteilungspolitik ; Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie ; Theorie ; Wahlkampf

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Schultz, Christian
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Copenhagen, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU)
• (where): Copenhagen
• (when): 2003

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/82010
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET