Arbeitspapier

Corporate Governance and Implications for Minority Shareholders in Turkey

This paper reports on the ownership and control structures of publicly listed firms in Turkey using data from 2001. While holding companies and non-financial firms are the most frequent owners at the direct level, families ultimately own more than 80 percent of all publicly listed firms in Turkey. Pyramids and dual class shares are common devices that families use to separate their cash-flow rights from control rights. We also show that such deviations result in significantly lower market to book ratios suggesting large agency costs because of the conflict of interests between controlling families and minority shareholders.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 2003/7

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies; Capacity
Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
Economic Development: Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
Thema
Ownership Structure
Corporate Governance
Business Groups
Family Ownership
Turkey

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Yurtoglu, Burcin
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Turkish Economic Association
(wo)
Ankara
(wann)
2003

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Yurtoglu, Burcin
  • Turkish Economic Association

Entstanden

  • 2003

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